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When governments meet in the international arena, their actions 
reflect the political  situations  at home. Previous  studies of trade rela- 
tions have focused on governments that are immune from political 
pressures  and that act as benevolent servants  of the public interest. 
Here we introduce domestic  politics  into the analysis  of international 
economic  relations.  We study the interactions  between national  lead- 
ers who are concerned with both providing  a high standard  of living 
to the general electorate  and collecting  campaign  contributions  from 
special-interest  groups. Our analysis  sheds light on the determinants 
of the structure of  protection in noncooperative and cooperative 
policy equilibria. 
I.  Introduction 
Recent  events  have highlighted  the extent  to which domestic  politics 
condition  international  economic  relations.  Special-interest  groups 
were visible and vocal in the weeks and years leading  up to the Uru- 
guay Round  trade pact and the North  American  Free Trade  Agree- 
ment.  Similarly,  industry  representatives  have  been  active  partici- 
pants  in  the  ongoing  trade  conflict  between  the  United  States  and 
Japan. There  can be little doubt  that interest  groups  have influenced 
these and other  policy outcomes. 
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In the political science  literature,  "statist" theories  have dominated 
recent  analysis of  foreign  economic  policy  (see  Cowhey  1990).  Such 
theories  cast an elite  group  of  executive  branch institutions  and offi- 
cials as relatively independent  players in the international  arena,  set- 
ting  policies  to  serve  national  objectives  (such  as balance-of-power 
diplomacy)  while making only occasional  and minimal concessions  to 
domestic  political  groups.  This  approach  has  its counterpart  in  the 
economics  literature  on trade relations,  which too has focused  on the 
actions and interactions  of autonomous  governments.  In his seminal 
paper on  "Optimum  Tariffs  and Retaliation" (1954),  Harry Johnson 
showed  how  policy interdependence  between  governments  could  be 
modeled  as  a  noncooperative  equilibrium  of  a  two-country  tariff 
game  (see  also  Kuga  1973;  Riezman  1982;  Kennan  and  Riezman 
1988).  Mayer (1981)  and  Riezman  (1982)  took a similar approach  to 
negotiated  trade agreements,  viewing  them  as equilibrium  outcomes 
to two-government  bargaining  games.  While these authors surely are 
to be commended  for emphasizing  the international  interactions  that 
feature  prominently  in foreign  policy determination,  one cannot help 
but  wonder  whether  their  analyses  capture  the  "true" objectives  of 
real-world  governments.  In every  case,  the  author  has cast the  gov- 
ernment  as a benevolent  servant of  the  national  interest. 
It is now  commonplace  to view  trade  policy  as an outgrowth  of  a 
political process  that does  not  necessarily  give  rise to aggregate  wel- 
fare maximization.  A growing literature on endogenous  policy forma- 
tion  treats interest  groups  (and  sometimes  voters)  as participants  in 
a competition  for political favors,  which are meted  out by politicians 
serving  their  own  selfish  interests.  However,  this  literature  has  fo- 
cused  exclusively  on  the case of  a small or isolated  country,  one  that 
sets  trade  policy  without  regard  to  the  extant  policies  and  possible 
reactions  of  its trade  partners. 
In this paper we develop  a formal  framework  capable of capturing 
both  strategic  interaction  between  interest  groups  and  politicians  in 
the domestic  arena and strategic interaction  between  governments  in 
the international  arena.  In doing  so, we follow  the path suggested  by 
Putnam (1988),  who argued  that international  relations  are best seen 
as just  such  a "two-level game." We  study  both  noncooperative  and 
cooperative  tariff-setting  games in a context  in which domestic  politics 
determine  international  objectives.  Our  goal  is  to  understand  how 
the  political  climate  in  one  country  conditions  policy  outcomes  in 
another, and how domestic  political pressures  on politicians condition 
their relations  with foreign  counterparts.1 
1 Hillman  and Moser (1995)  also view trade policies as the outgrowth  of interactions 
between  politically motivated  governments.  Their  analysis differs  from ours inasmuch TRADE  WARS  677 
In  Section  II, we outline  our  model  and  discuss its relation  to the 
existing  literature.  Section  III  spells  out  the  formal  assumptions  of 
the  model  and  the  nature  of  a political  equilibrium.  In  Sections  IV 
and V, we study two-country  policy games, assuming first that govern- 
ments  set their  policies  noncooperatively  and  then  that they  engage 
in international  negotiations.  Section  VI compares  the predictions  of 
our model  with some  of  the  findings  in the empirical  literature. 
II.  Model  Outline  and  Relation  to the  Literature 
In democracies,  trade  policies  are set by elected  representatives.  Be- 
cause the public typically is less than fully informed  about trade issues 
and because  most  elections  cover  many  issues,  these  representatives 
need  not always select  policies  that maximize  the welfare  of  the  me- 
dian  voter.  Other  policies  may  better  serve  the  politicians'  goal  of 
being reelected  and any further  objectives they may have. The  litera- 
ture  on  trade  policy  formation  studies  the  choices  made  by elected 
representatives  who  may  receive  financial  and  other  inducements 
from special-interest  lobby groups. 
One  strand of  literature  began  with Brock  and  Magee  (1978)  and 
is most  fully  articulated  in  Magee,  Brock,  and  Young  (1989).  They 
consider  an  election  between  two  parties  representing  protectionist 
and free-trade  interests.  Prior to the election,  each  party commits  to 
a platform  specifying  the  trade  policy  it would  carry out  if  elected. 
Then,  seeing  these  platforms,  lobby  groups  representing  capital 
(which would benefit  from free trade) and labor (which would benefit 
from high tariffs) make campaign  contributions  to the respective  par- 
ties championing  their  causes.  The  contributions  finance  campaign 
expenditures,  which  in  turn  affect  the  parties'  probabilities  of  win- 
ning  the election.  Magee  et al. study the Nash equilibrium  platforms 
that emerge  when  the  parties  act as Stackelberg  leaders  vis-a-vis the 
lobbies.2 
A second  strand  emanates  from  the writings  of  Stigler (1971)  and 
Peltzman  (1976)  on  domestic  regulatory  policy.  Hillman  (1982)  ap- 
as they use reduced-form  political support  functions  to describe  the objectives of each 
government  (see the discussion below). Our analysis goes further in explicitly modeling 
the behavior  of special-interest  groups  that determines  a specific relationship  between 
policy choices  and  political support.  Also,  they  study a single  sector,  whereas  we con- 
sider  the  structure  of  protection  in  noncooperative  and  cooperative  equilibria  with 
many goods. 
2 Findlay  and  Wellisz  (1982)  developed  a reduced  form  of  the  Brock  and  Magee 
approach.  In their  formulation,  a tariff  formation  function summarizes  the  relationship 
between  the contributions  (or other  spending)  of the two lobbies and the policies  that 
emerge  from  the  political  process.  They  study  Nash  equilibrium  contributions  by the 
lobbies,  taking  the  policy  function  as given. 678  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
plied  these  ideas  to trade  policy  formation,  with further  elaboration 
by  Long  and  Vousden  (1991).  Their  approach  sees  an  incumbent 
government  that  is in  a  position  to  choose  trade  policy  but  is con- 
strained by the prospect  of the next election.  The  government  recog- 
nizes that favors granted  to special-interest  groups  may elicit financial 
and other  support  but also may cause dissatisfaction  among  elements 
of  the  general  electorate.  While  avoiding  the  details  of  motives  and 
actions,  the  authors  summarize  the  relevant  trade-off  in  a political 
support  function: the  government's  "support" depends  directly  on  its 
policies (because they affect voter well-being)  and indirectly on policy 
through  its effect  on the rents accruing  to certain interests.  The  gov- 
ernment  selects a policy to maximize  its political support. 
Our  own  approach,  first  developed  in  Grossman  and  Helpman 
(1994),  combines  elements  of  these  two.  As in  the  political  support 
approach,  we focus on an incumbent  government  that is in a position 
to set its nation's  trade  policies.  We go  beyond  that approach,  how- 
ever, by modeling  the actions available to the organized  special inter- 
ests and  the  incentives  they  face  in  deciding  their  political  involve- 
ment.  In  other  words,  rather  than  specify  a  support  function 
exogenously,  we  derive  one  from  the  equilibrium  actions  of  profit- 
maximizing  lobby groups.  The  lobbies in our formulation,  like those 
in the electoral  competition  models  of  Magee  et al., decide  what size 
campaign  contributions  to  offer  the  political  representatives.  But 
whereas  Magee  et al. see  lobbies  as setting  their  contributions  after 
policy positions  have been  taken and with the sole objective of influ- 
encing  the election  outcome,  we see the lobbies as offering  contribu- 
tions  with  the  aim  of  influencing  the  policy  announcements  them- 
selves. In other words, our lobbies seek to curry favor with politicians 
who covet  their financial support.3 
Our  model  is outlined  as follows.  Lobby groups  represent  factor 
owners with stakes in certain industries.  Each lobby confronts  its na- 
tional  government  with  a  campaign  contribution  schedule, that  is,  a 
schedule  relating  its promised  gift to the action taken by the govern- 
ment.4 These  schedules  will not,  of  course,  be formal  contracts,  nor 
will  they  often  be  explicitly  announced.  Still,  the  government  will 
3 In Grossman  and Helpman  (1994),  we discuss the empirical evidence  on campaign 
giving by political action committees  in the United  States. This  evidence  strongly  sug- 
gests  that  "PAC money  is interested  money"  with  "more  than  electoral  objective  in 
mind" (Magelby and  Nelson  1990,  p. 55). 
4 An  issue  arises  as to whether  the  industry  lobbies  can also offer  contributions  to 
politicians  in  the  other  country's  government.  Interest  groups  do  sometimes  try  to 
influence  a foreign  government's  policy choices.  But  politicians  often  view gifts  from 
foreign  sources  as tainted  money.  We choose  to focus in the text on  the case in which 
lobbies contribute  only to their own national  governments  while treating  the case with 
foreign  contributions  in a series of  notes. TRADE WARS  679 
know  that  an  implicit  relationship  exists  between  the  way  it  treats 
each organized  lobby and  the  contributions  it can  expect  to receive 
from  that group.  We assume  that the contribution  schedules  are set 
to  maximize  the  aggregate  welfare  of  the  lobby  group's  members, 
taking as given the schedules  offered  by the other organized  groups. 
Faced with  the  contribution  schedules  of  the  various  lobbies,  the 
incumbents  choose  a vector of  trade taxes and subsidies on the vari- 
ous import  and  export  goods.  Their  objective  in this is to maximize 
their own political welfare.  We allow the politicians' utility to depend 
on the welfare  of  the average  voter and  the total amount  of  political 
contributions.  Average  welfare is included  in the government's  objec- 
tive to reflect the likelihood  that prospects  for reelection  depend  on 
the well-being  of the general  electorate.  Contributions  enter  the gov- 
ernment's  utility  function  because  campaign  funds  can be  used  for 
political  advertising  and  because  the  contributions  sometimes  aug- 
ment  the  candidates'  personal  fortunes  or  provide  them  with other 
political  benefits  (see  Grossman  and  Helpman  [1994]  for  more  on 
this point). 
In our  earlier  paper,  we followed  the  political economy  literature 
in assuming  that  the  government  could  take world  prices  as given. 
Accordingly,  there was no scope  for interaction  between  the govern- 
ments  and  no  possibility  for  the  interest  groups  in  one  country  to 
influence  policy outcomes  elsewhere.  Here,  in contrast,  we focus  on 
the  interactions  between  countries.  First we  characterize  the  Nash 
equilibrium  of  a  noncooperative  game  between  the  two  politically 
motivated  governments.  Then  we consider  a bargaining  situation  in 
which policies  are set in an international  negotiation. 
III.  The Formal Model 
We consider  the  trade relations  between  two countries,  "home" and 
"foreign." The  countries  have similar political and economic  systems, 
although  their  tastes, endowments,  and  political conditions  may dif- 
fer. We describe  in detail the political and economic  structure of the 
home  country. 
Residents  of the home  country  share identical additively separable 
preferences.  Each individual  maximizes  a utility function  of the form 
n 
U  = 
CZ +  Ui(cxi),  (1) 
i=l 
where  CZ  is consumption  of  good  Z and  cxi is consumption  of  good 
Xi, i  =  1, 2, . . . , n. The  functions  ui(Q)  are differentiable,  increasing, 
and strictly concave.  Good Z serves as a numeraire,  with a world and 
domestic  price  equal  to one.  We  denote  by pi the  domestic  price  of 68o  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
good  Xi in the  home  country,  and  7ri represents  its offshore  price.5 
With these  preferences,  each resident  of the home  country  demands 
d-(p-) units of  good  Xi, i  =  1, 2,  ...  ,  n, where  d-Q) is the inverse  of 
u,'( ). The  consumer  devotes  the  remainder  of  his total spending  of 
E to the numeraire  good,  thereby  attaining  the utility level 
v(p,E)  =  E +  S(p),  (2) 
where  p  =  (PI,  P2'  ,  Pn) is the  vector  of  home  prices  of  the 
nonnumeraire  goods  and  S(p)  I-  ui[di(p-)]  -  E. pidi(pi)  is  the 
consumer  surplus  enjoyed  on  these  goods. 
The  numeraire  good  Z can  be  produced  from  labor  alone,  with 
constant returns to scale. We assume that the aggregate  labor supply, 
1, is sufficiently  large  to ensure  a positive  output  of  this good.  Then 
we  can  choose  units  so  that  the  competitive  wage  rate  equals  one. 
Each of  the  other  goods  is manufactured  from  labor  and  a sector- 
specific input,  also with constant  returns to scale. The  various specific 
inputs are available in inelastic supply. We denote  by HA(Pi)  the aggre- 
gate rent  accruing  to the  specific  factor  used  in producing  good  Xi, 
and we note  that the slope  of  this function  gives the industry  supply 
curve, that is, 
Xi(pi)  =  Hi(P).  (3) 
The  government  has a limited  set of  policy instruments  at its dis- 
posal. We allow it to tax or subsidize trade in any of the nonnumeraire 
goods  and to collect revenues  or distribute  tax receipts  using  a (neu- 
tral) head  tax or subsidy.  In other  words,  the  government  must  use 
trade policies  to effect  any income  redistribution  between  groups  in 
the  economy.  In  reality,  governments  appear  to  have  difficulty  in 
using  direct and transparent  instruments  to transfer  income,  so they 
resort to less direct  means  instead.  Our model  highlights  the role  of 
trade policy as a potential  tool of  income  redistribution. 
The  ad  valorem  trade  taxes  or  subsidies  drive  a wedge  between 
domestic  and offshore  prices.  We represent  these  policies  by the pa- 
rameters  Tv such that Pi  =  TisT.  Then  Tv>  1 represents  one  plus the 
rate of tariff on an import good or one plus the rate of export  subsidy 
on an export  good.  Similarly,  i <  1 represents  an import  subsidy or 
an  export  tax.  The  vector  of  trade  policies  r  =  (TI,  T2,  .  .  .T, 
generates  per capita government  revenue  of 
r(r,  iT)  =  i(Ti  -  1) Xr  di(Ti  ) 
-  hX(TiT)1,  (4) 
5The offshore price need not be the same as the price prevailing in the foreign 
country, because the foreign country may impose trade taxes or subsidies  of its own. 
We use p* to denote the internal price in the foreign country. TRADE  WARS  681 
where  a  =  (7T1,  7T2,  .  .  .  X Tr,) and N  measures  the  total population, 
which we henceforth  normalize  to one. The  government  redistributes 
the tariff revenue  evenly  to the  public. 
Individuals  collect  income  from  several  sources.  Most earn  wages 
as workers, and all receive  the same transfer  (possibly negative)  from 
the government.  In addition,  some  individuals  own  claims to one  of 
the  specific  inputs.  These  assets are indivisible  and  nontradable  (as, 
e.g.,  with claims to sector-specific  human  capital), so individuals  can- 
not  hold  more  than  one  type.  Clearly,  those  who  own  some  of  the 
specific  factor  used  in  industry  i  will  see  their  income  tied  to  the 
domestic  price  of  good  Xi.  These  individuals  have  a direct  stake  in 
the trade policy Tv, in addition  to their general  interest  as consumers 
in all policies  that affect  domestic  prices. 
The owners of the specific input used in sector i, with their common 
desire  for  protection  (or  export  subsidies)  for  their  industry,  may 
choose  to join  forces  to express  their  policy wishes  to the incumbent 
government.  We assume that the various owners of some  (or perhaps 
all) of the specific inputs  form  political action groups,  but the owners 
of  the  remaining  specific  inputs  (if  any)  fail  to  organize  politically. 
The  set of organized  industries  is taken as exogenous  here. The  orga- 
nized  groups  enjoy  a political advantage  relative  to individual  factor 
owners inasmuch  as the groups control substantially greater resources 
than most individuals.  With these vast resources  at their disposal,  the 
lobbyists can gain  access to politicians  to communicate  their  political 
demands.  We  assume  that the  lobbies  express  their  demands  in the 
form  of  contribution  schedules;  that  is,  they  offer  to  contribute  to 
the campaign  funds  of the incumbent  politicians  an amount  that de- 
pends  on  the particular policies  implemented  by the government,  as 
well as perhaps  the concessions  that the politicians  manage  to extract 
from the foreign  government  in the course  of any trade negotiation. 
While  the  unorganized  individuals  (including  those  individuals  who 
own  none  of  the  specific  inputs)  might  also wish  to  "bid" for  trade 
policies  in  this way, we  assume  that the  politicians  will not  take  the 
time  to hear  their  offers,  which  are likely to be small in view of  the 
limited  income  of  an  individual  factor  owner  and  the  limited  stake 
that any one  person  has in the  policy outcome.  In short,  we assume 
that politically  unorganized  individuals  have  no  means  to  influence 
policy with their campaign  contributions;  they enter the political pro- 
cess only  as voters. 
The  organized  input  owners  coordinate  their  political activities so 
as to maximize  their joint  welfare.  The  lobby representing  industry  i 
submits the contribution  schedule  CQr, -) that maximizes 
VI  =  WV(r,  ar)  -  Ci,*)  (5) 682  JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
where 
Wi(, irw)  i +  H[i(Tini) +  cti[r(, 'r,)  +  S(,rw)],  (6) 
ai is the fraction  of  the  population  that owns the specific input  used 
in sector i (also their  measure,  given  that N  =  1), and 1i is the joint 
labor endowment  of these factor owners.6 Equation (6) gives the total 
gross-of-contributions  welfare  of  the  ai  members  of  lobby  group  i, 
which they derive from wages, quasi rents, transfers from the govern- 
ment,  and  surplus  from  consuming  the  nonnumeraire  goods  (see 
eq.  [2]).  Notice  that  we  have  omitted  all but  one  argument  of  the 
contribution  schedule.  This allows us to distinguish  the case of a trade 
war, where the contribution  schedule  depends  only on the actions of 
the home  government,  from  that of  trade talks, where  the contribu- 
tions  may also depend  on  actions  taken  by the  foreign  government 
under  any agreement. 
Facing the  contribution  schedules  offered  by the  various  lobbies, 
the incumbents  set trade policy-either  unilaterally or through  a pro- 
cess  of  international  bargaining-so  as  to  maximize  their  political 
welfare.  We assume  that the  politicians  care about the accumulation 
of campaign  contributions  and perhaps  also about the welfare  of the 
average voter. As we discussed  in Section  II, the politicians may value 
contributions  as  a  source  of  funding  for  campaign  advertisements 
and  possibly  for  other  reasons.  A  concern  for  average  welfare  will 
arise  if  the  prospects  for  reelection  depend  on  the  average  voter's 
prosperity.  We  posit  a  linear  form  for  the  government's  objective 
function,  namely 
G =  1ieL  C2Qr,) +  aW(',  a),  a ?  0,  (7) 
where L is the set of  organized  industries  and 
W('r, zr)-  1 +  Ti Hli(Tiwi)  +  r(r, I)  +  S(T)  (8) 
measures  average  (gross) welfare.  The  parameter  a in (7) represents 
the government's  weighting  of a dollar of social welfare compared  to 
a dollar  of  campaign  contributions,  considering  both  the  perceived 
political value of the funding  and the indirect cost associated with the 
contributor's loss of welfare. 
As we mentioned  before,  the foreign  country has a similar political 
and  economic  structure,  although  the  subutility  functions  ut(  ), the 
profit functions  11'{),  the set of organized  industries L*, the number 
a* of voters with claims to the specific input used in sector i, and the 
weight  a*  that the  government  places  on  aggregate  welfare  relative 
to  contributions  may  differ  from  those  in  the  home  country  (the 
6 In (6) we have used the notation  em in the argument  of S() to represent the vector 
('irrf1,  T2  .'2......  r,1'rr).  Thus re  = p is the vector of home country prices. TRADE  WARS  683 
analogous  functions  and  parameters  have  no  asterisks).  Equations 
analogous  to (1)-(8)  apply  to the  foreign  country,  where  trade  poli- 
cies areT*  =  (T*,  T,  ...  I  .,T),  internal  prices are p*  =  (p*  p  . 
p*),  output  in sector i is Xi8, and so forth. 
Having  specified  the  production  and  demand  sides  of  each  econ- 
omy,  we  turn  now  to  the  international  equilibrium.  Net  imports  of 
good  i in the  home  country  are M.(p-)  =  d-(p-)  -  X-(p-), and  those 
in the foreign  country  equal M  (p !)  =  di(pi)  -  X8(pi).  Recall that 
Pi  =  T-ris and pie =  Trirr-. Then  world  product  markets  clear  when 
M -i(T r)  +  M'(T"ir')  =  0,  i =  1, 2,...  , n.  (9) 
This equation  allows us to solve for the market-clearing  price of good 
Xi as a function  of  the  industry  trade  taxes or subsidies  imposed  by 
the  two  countries.  We  denote  this  functional  relationship  by  -i'Q(, 
Ti).  It follows  from  (9) that the  functions  nrr(Q)  are homogeneous  of 
degree  minus  one;  that  is, if  the  home  country  were  to increase  its 
tariff on imports  of some  good  and the foreign  country  increased  its 
export  subsidy by the same percentage  amount,  then the world price 
would  fall  so  as  to  leave  the  domestic  prices  in  each  country  un- 
changed. 
Using  (9), we can express  the (gross-of-contributions)  welfare levels 
of  the  organized  interest  groups  and  of  the  average  voter  in  each 
country as functions  of the trade policy vectors  r and r.  For example, 
the  expression  in  (6) for  the  gross  welfare  of  owners  of  the  specific 
factor used  in home  industry  i becomes  W-(T,  T*)  -W[i,  w(Tr,  T*)], 
and the average  welfare  of home  voters can be written as W(T, T*) 
W[t,  w(Ir,  T*)].  Inserting  these  functions  into  (5) and  (7) and  their 
foreign  analogues  gives  the  objectives  of  the  lobbies  and  politicians 
as functions  of the trade  policy vectors  in each country. 
We describe  finally  the  sequence  of  actions  by the  various  agents 
in  our  two-country  model.  The  lobbies  in  each  country  move  first, 
setting contribution  schedules  that link their gifts to the various possi- 
ble policy outcomes.  The  lobbies act simultaneously  and noncoopera- 
tively, each  taking  as given  the  schedules  of  all other  lobbies  in  the 
same and the other country.  Then  the governments  set their national 
trade policies. In Section IV, where we study trade wars, these policies 
are set in a noncooperative,  simultaneous-move  game.  In Section  V, 
which deals with international  negotiations,  the policies emerge  from 
the  specified  bargaining  process.  In  both  cases,  we  assume  that  the 
implicit contracts  between  the  politicians  and  interest  groups  in one 
country  (i.e.,  the  contribution  schedules  that  have  been  communi- 
cated  by the  lobbyists  to the  government)  are not  observable  to the 
government  in  the  other.  The  importance  of  this  assumption  will 
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IV.  Trade  Wars 
We begin our analysis of the international  economic  relations between 
politically motivated  governments  with the case of a trade war. Here, 
the  governments  behave  unilaterally,  ignoring  the  impacts  of  their 
actions  on  political  and  economic  agents  in  the  opposite  country. 
While  purely  noncooperative  outcomes  are  unlikely  to emerge  in  a 
world with repeated  interactions  and  many forums  for trade discus- 
sions, the extreme  case of noncooperation  sheds light on the political 
forces that shape trade policies  during  the frequent  departures  from 
harmony  and cooperation  in the trading  realm. 
Let us define  an equilibrium  response  by each country  to an arbitrary 
policy  choice  of  the  other.  We  use  the  home  country  to  illustrate, 
although  a similar definition  applies  to the foreign  country. 
DEFINITION  1.  Let  r*  be  an  arbitrary  trade  policy  vector  of  the 
foreign  country.  Then  a  set  of  feasible  contribution  functions 
{fC?}ieL and a trade policy vector  r  are an equilibrium  response  to r 
if (a) 
=  arg max  iEiL  Ci(T;  T*)  +  aW(e,  T*) 
and (b) for every organized  interest  group  i E  L there  does  not exist 
a feasible  contribution  function  CQ(T;  T*)  and a trade policy vector  r 
such that (i) 
T=  arg max C (T;  T*)  +  Ej,"i, jEL  C?(T;  T*)  +  aW(T,  T) 
and (ii) 
W (T,  T*)-C  (T;  T)  >  W-(T0,  T)  -  C  (T0; T) 
An  equilibrium  response  comprises  a set  of  feasible  contribution 
schedules  and a policy vector.  Each contribution  schedule  prescribes 
a political donation  for each trade policy vector  r that the home  gov- 
ernment  might  select.  Feasible schedules  are those  that promise  only 
nonnegative  offers  that do  not  exceed  the  aggregate  income  of  the 
group's  members.  Condition  a  of  the  definition  stipulates  that  the 
politicians  select  the  policy vector  that best serves their own interest, 
given  the  policy  of  the  foreign  government  and  the  contribution 
schedules  offered  by  the  domestic  lobbies.  Condition  b states  that, 
given the set of contributions  offered  by all lobbies other  than itself, 
no  individual  lobby  i can  improve  its  lot  by  setting  a contribution 
schedule  C-Q) different  from  Co{),  thereby  inducing  the  home  gov- 
ernment  to choose  the  policy vector  I. 
Several aspects of this definition  bear further  discussion.  First, our 
definition  supposes  that  the  lobbies  do  not  cooperate  with  one  an- TRADE  WARS  685 
other. While it is occasionally the case that several lobbies in a country 
will coordinate  their activities to pursue  a common  goal and even that 
lobbies  in  different  countries  will join  forces,  the  norm  is certainly 
for the various industry  representatives  to take independent  political 
action.  One  explanation  for  this observation  might  be that pressure 
groups  cannot  write binding  contracts  specifying  their contributions 
to  politicians  and  other  political  activities.  In  the  absence  of  such 
contracts,  it would  be difficult  for  the  different  lobby groups  to en- 
force  any  cooperative  agreement  among  themselves.  Also,  in  our 
model,  the scope  for cooperation  between  lobbies in any one  country 
is limited  because  the interests  of different  producers  are mostly op- 
posed  to  one  another.  Lobbies  representing  the  same  industry  in 
different  countries  also  have  opposing  views  about  desirable  policy 
interventions,  as we shall see. 
Our definition  also presumes  that the lobbies condition  their prom- 
ised contributions  on  the  expected  policy choices  of  the  other  coun- 
try's government.  In other words, the lobbies take the other country's 
policy as given, even though  these lobbies make their decisions  before 
the  governments  make  theirs.  The  lobbies  certainly  would  wish  to 
influence  the  choices  of  the  other  government  if it were  possible  to 
do  so.  But  here  is where  our  assumption  that a lobby's offers  to its 
own government  cannot be observed  by the other  government  comes 
into play. If the  home  lobbies could  make  their  promises  observable 
to foreign  politicians  and  if they  could  commit  to their contribution 
schedules  immutably,  then  the lobbies would  set their schedules  stra- 
tegically in order to induce  a favorable  policy response  by the foreign 
government.  The  situation  would  be  similar  to  that  analyzed  by 
Fershtman  and Judd  (1987),  who  showed  that the  owners  of  a firm 
generally will want to set a compensation  schedule  that gives the firm's 
managers  an incentive  to act aggressively  in oligopolistic  competition 
against other  firms. But,  as Katz (1991)  later argued,  a strategic  de- 
sign of  an agent's compensation  schedule  can bear fruit in a delega- 
tion game  (i.e.,  a game  in which  agents  play on behalf  of  principals) 
only  if  the  contracts  between  principal  and  agent  are observable  to 
the  opposing  players.  Otherwise,  the  opposing  players  will  not  be 
influenced  by (unobserved)  manipulation  of the principal-agent  con- 
tract, and  so there  can be no  gain  to the  principals  (in our  case,  the 
home  lobbies)  from  such  manipulation. 
It is natural for us to assume that contribution  schedules  cannot  be 
observed  abroad,  for at least two reasons.  First, it might be problem- 
atic for  special-interest  groups  to  be  open  and  explicit  about  their 
willingness  to  pay the  government  for  favorable  treatment.  Second, 
even  if the  interest  groups  were  to announce  their  intention  to vary 
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promises  would  not  be  legally  binding  and  policy  makers  abroad 
would  not  know  whether  there  were  further  details  or  subsequent 
agreements  besides  those  that  had  been  made  public.  In  cases  in 
which multiple  agreements  or renegotiation  is possible,  a lobby's an- 
nouncement  of  its  contribution  schedule  carries  little  commitment 
value  (see  Katz  1991).  Accordingly,  we  feel justified  in  studying  an 
equilibrium  in  which  the  industry  groups  condition  their  lobbying 
strategies  on what they  expect  will be the other  government's  policy 
choice,  but do  not  see  themselves  as able to influence  those  policies 
by their own choice  of contribution  schedule. 
To  find the equilibrium  responses  for each country,  we proceed  as 
in Grossman  and  Helpman  (1994).  There  we characterized  equilib- 
rium trade  policies  for  a small country  that takes external  prices  as 
given.  We  noted  the  applicability  of  the  theory  of  common  agency 
developed  by Bernheim  and Whinston  (1986),  wherein  a single  actor 
acts simultaneously  as the  agent  for  several  different  principals.  In 
the present  context,  once  we take the  foreign  policy vector as given, 
we have a situation  in which  the  home  government  acts as an agent 
for the various special-interest  groups  in the home  country.  We have 
already derived  the payoffs  to the principals  and the agent  for every 
action open  to the latter, so we can proceed  to apply  the  Bernheim- 
Whinston  results to characterize  the equilibrium  responses. 
We  know  from  lemma  2  in  Bernheim  and  Whinston  (1986)  (or 
proposition  1 in Grossman and Helpman  [1994])  that the equilibrium 
policy response  to  r  satisfies, in addition  to condition  a of definition 
1, the following  requirement  that is implied  by condition  b:7 
0  =  arg max W (aT *)  -  CO  (T;  7*) 
+  jEL  C? (7;  *)  +  aW(7,  *)  for every i E L.  (  0) 
This condition  has a simple interpretation:  the equilibrium  trade pol- 
icy vector  must  maximize  the joint  welfare  of  each  lobby  i and  the 
government,  when  the  contribution  schedules  of  all  lobbies  other 
than  i  are  taken  as  given.  If  this  were  not  the  case,  lobby  i could 
reformulate  its  schedule  to  induce  the  government  to  choose  the 
jointly  optimal  policy  vector  instead  of  the  alternative,  and  it could 
do  so  in  such  a way as to  share  in  the  surplus  from  the  switch  in 
policy. In equilibrium  there can exist no such possibilities for a lobby 
to  improve  its lot.  Of  course,  the  same  holds  true  for  the  foreign 
lobbies,  so that an equation  analogous  to (10) applies  to  r*O 
Let us assume  now that the lobbies set contribution  schedules  that 
7 This  is a necessary  condition  for  an equilibrium.  All the  necessary  and  sufficient 
conditions  are given  in proposition  1 of  Grossman  and  Helpman  (1994). TRADE  WARS  687 
are differentiable,  at least around  the equilibrium  point.8 We have ar- 
gued  in  Grossman  and  Helpman  (1994)  that  there  are  compelling 
reasons  for  focusing  on  contribution  schedules  that have  this  prop- 
erty.  For  example,  differentiable  schedules  may  be  robust  to  small 
calculation  errors.  With  differentiability,  a trade  policy  vector  that 
satisfies (10) also satisfies the first-order  condition 
VTWi(70; 7*)  -  VTCi(70, 7*)  +  1jEL  VTCj(7;  *)  1 
+  aVTW(70,  a*) =  0  for all i E L. 
The  home  politicians' utility maximization  ensures,  by part a of defi- 
nition  1, that 
YjEL VTCj(W; ar*) +  aVTW((, 7*)  =  0.  (12) 
Taken  together,  (11) and  (12) imply 
VTC?(?r;  A*) =  VT  W- (T',  *)  for all i E L;  (13) 
that is, the contribution  schedules  are set so that the marginal change 
in the  donation  for  a small change  in home  policy  (with the  foreign 
policy taken as given)  matches  the effect  of the policy change  on the 
lobby's gross welfare.  In Grossman and Helpman  (1994),  we referred 
to  this  property  of  the  equilibrium  contribution  schedules  as  local 
truthfulness. 
We sum equation  (13) over  all i and  substitute  the  result into  (12) 
to derive 
XiEL  VTWi(T',  7*)  +  aVTW(T?,  T*)  =  0.  (14) 
This  equation  allows us to compute  the equilibrium  home  policy re- 
sponse  to an arbitrary foreign  policy vector  *. Similarly, we have 
XiEL*  V*Wi  (T*0,7  )  +  a*V  *W*(7*o,7)  =  0,  (14*) 
which  gives  the  foreign  equilibrium  response  to  an  arbitrary home 
policy vector. 
At last we are ready  to define  a full  equilibrium  in the  trade war. 
When  the  policies  are  set,  each  government  makes  an  equilibrium 
response  to what it expects  the other's  policy will be. We can invoke 
the concept  of  a Nash  equilibrium  as follows. 
DEFINITION  2.  A noncooperative  trade  policy  equilibrium  consists 
of sets of  political contribution  functions  {C i}ieL  and  {Ci*}ieL*  and  a 
8 Typically,  the  contribution  schedules  would  not  be  differentiable  where  the  con- 
straint  that  payments  must  be  nonnegative  becomes  binding,  i.e.,  where  C ()  =  0. 
However,  this is not a problem  for our arguments  since we shall assume differentiabil- 
ity only around  equilibria  in which  C?(?r';  r*?) >  0 for all i. 688  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
pair of  trade  policy  vectors  ?'  and  '*?  such  that  [{Ci}ieL,  T']  is an 
equilibrium  response  to  *'? and  [{C*}iEL*,  T*O]  is an equilibrium  re- 
sponse  to  r. 
We proceed  now  to characterize  the  equilibrium  policy vectors  by 
substituting  r?  for  r  in (14) and ?' for  r in (14*) and then  treating 
these  equations  as a system of  simultaneous  equations.  We calculate 
the  derivatives  in  (14)  using  (4),  (6),  (8),  and  the  definitions  of  the 
import functions  Mi  ) and the gross benefit  functions  W-Q)  and W(O). 
This  gives 
(ItL  -  aL)(i  +  'rti  TI)XI  +  (a  +  aL) 
(15) 
x  [(T  -  I)rri(T-r  +  T'Ioil)MI  -  rITlMi]  =  0, 
where IiL is an indicator variable that equals one if industry i is politi- 
cally organized  and  zero  otherwise,  and  aL  =jEL  j 
is  the  fraction 
of voters that are represented  by a lobby. From (9) we find the partials 
of the world price functions,  rj(r).9  Substituting  them into (15) yields 
an expression  for the home  country's  equilibrium  policy,  namely 
0  IL  -OL  Xi  1  T-  1 =  -  +  -  fori=  1,2,...,n,  (16) 
where  e!  = Tv-M/'IM'  is the  elasticity of  foreign  import  demand 
or export  supply  (depending  on whether  MI  is positive or negative). 
An  analogous  equation  describes  the  equilibrium  foreign  trade  pol- 
icy; that is, 
I*  -a0*  X!, 
T!  1  -  L  +  -  fori=  1, 2, ...  ,n,  (16*) 
a*  +  c0  TriMI'  ei 
where e -v  =Tr-MI'IM-  is the home country's import demand  or export 
supply  elasticity. 
Equations  (16)  and  (16*)  express  the  ad  valorem  trade  tax  and 
subsidy  rates  in  each  country  as  sums  of  two  components.  These 
components  represent,  respectively,  the political support and  terms-of- 
trade motives  for trade intervention.  The  first component  has exactly 
the  same  form  as the  expression  in Grossman  and  Helpman  (1994) 
for the equilibrium  policy in a small country facing fixed world prices. 
It reflects  a balancing  of  the  deadweight  loss  associated  with  trade 
policies  (given  the terms of trade) and the income  gains that special- 
interest groups  can capture  via such policies.  The  second  component 
represents  the familiar "optimum  tariff"  (or export  tax) that applies 
in a large country  with a benevolent  dictator.  Given the balancing  of 
'We  have  7rr1/7r- =  -Mi'I(T-M1'  +  T*'M"')  and  rr,2/7r, =  -M"'I(T-M'  +  Ti'M*"). TRADE  WARS  689 
special and general  interests implicit in the first term, this second term 
enters  the  political calculus  as an added  reason  why noncooperating 
governments  will wish to tax international  trade. 
It  is  apparent  from  (16)  and  (16*)  that  an  organized  import- 
competing  industry  emerges  from  a trade war with a protective  tariff 
(since ei* >  0 when  the  foreign  country  exports  good  i), whereas  an 
unorganized  home  export  industry  suffers  an export  tax (since e!* < 
0  when  the  foreign  country  imports  good  i).  In  the  former  case, 
the  terms-of-trade  considerations  reinforce  the  industry's  lobbying 
efforts.  In  the  latter  case,  the  government's  desire  to  drive  up  the 
world  price  with  an  export  tax  finds  support  from  all  organized 
groups,  whose  members  are consumers  of the exportable  good.  Only 
in cases of organized  export  sectors and  unorganized  import  sectors 
do the special and general  interests come  into conflict-at  least as far 
as  the  sign,  as  opposed  to  the  size,  of  the  desired  trade  policy  is 
concerned. 
Consider,  for example,  an organized  export  industry  (so that ei* < 
0 and IiL  =  1). The  industry's prospects  for securing  an export  sub- 
sidy are better the greater industry output,  the smaller the price sensi- 
tivities of  domestic  supply  and  demand,  and  the  smaller  the  weight 
a that home  politicians  place  on  average  welfare.  A  large  domestic 
output  raises  the  stakes for  owners  of  the  specific  input  and  makes 
them willing to bid more  for support.  Such bids have a greater  influ- 
ence  on  the  politicians  when  they are less concerned  with the  public 
interest and when  the deadweight  loss associated with a given  depar- 
ture from  free  trade is small (i.e.,  IM' j is small). On the other  hand, 
for a given  value  of  a and  given  conditions  in the  domestic  market, 
the  more  inelastic  the  foreign  import  demand  curve,  the  more  in- 
clined  the  home  government  will be  to  choose  an  export  tax  as its 
equilibrium  policy.  This  accords with intuition  since the home  coun- 
try's market  power  in  trade  varies  with  the  inverse  of  the  foreign 
elasticity, so the potential  social gains from trade taxes become  larger 
as  I  j  declines.  We note  that the second  term can outweigh  the first 
even if the government  pays no attention  whatsoever  to national wel- 
fare  (i.e.,  a  =  0).  The  reason  is  that  the  members  of  the  various 
interest  groups  themselves  share  in  the  terms-of-trade  gains  from 
trade taxes, and they may collectively  bid for an export  tax for indus- 
try i even  though  the  lobby that represents  the  industry  presses  for 
a subsidy.'0 
10 In the case in which lobbies can contribute  to foreign  politicians  as well as to their 
own national  government,  the lobbies still find it optimal  to be locally truthful  in their 
contribution  offers  to each government.  The  implication  is that the left-hand  side of (15) 
has some  additional  terms  representing  the  effect  of  a marginal  change  in the  home 
tariff  on  the  aggregate  welfare  of  foreign  interest  group  members.  To  calculate  the 690  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
It is interesting  to compare  the policy outcomes  in our  model  with 
those  derived  by Johnson  (1954)  under  the assumption  that govern- 
ments  maximize  social welfare.  This  comparison  allows us to isolate 
the  role  that domestic  politics  play in determining  the outcome  of  a 
trade war. We note  that our  model  reproduces  the Johnson  equilib- 
rium  as a limiting  case when  the  governments  care overwhelmingly 
about voters' welfare  (so that a and a* approach  infinity)."  Then  the 
governments  apply the familiar inverse elasticity rules in setting trade 
taxes. 
In making the comparison,  we focus on a special case in which both 
countries  have constant  trade elasticities.  We may limit our attention 
to  the  outcome  in  a single  industry  because  the  equilibrium  policy 
responses  depend  only on the characteristics of industry i and aggre- 
gate  variables  (see  [16]  and  [16*]).  For  concreteness,  we  make  the 
home  country  the  importer  of  good  Xi.  Then  its  import  demand 
curve  is  given  by M  =  m (TN)-E,  with  m >  0  and  E  =  -e>  1.12 
The  foreign  country's  export  supply  function  has the form  -M*  - 
m*(*9r)'*,  with m* >  0 and  E*  =  ee >  0. 
Figure  1 shows the Johnson  equilibrium  at point J.  This  point  lies 
at the  intersection  of  two best-response  functions,  BB  for  the  home 
country  and  B*B*  for  the  foreign  country,  where  B  refers  to  the 
domestic  tariff response  functions,  we would  need  to add to the left-hand  side of  (15) 
the  following  expression: 
V*  -  OL*)I'ilXi  +  a  *[(hi  -  1)iTji'M~` 
- 
Ml]'r-r. 
The  resulting  analogue  to the tariff formula  (16) is somewhat  complicated  but is easily 
interpreted  for  the  case  in  which  the  lobby  groups  are  a negligible  fraction  of  the 
voting  population  in each  country;  i.e.,  aL =  cLP  =  0.  In  this special  case,  the  home 
country's equilibrium  tariff is given  by 
1j  X  *  X* 
T?-1  --  +  -  ~+ -(  a  -rrM  a 
= 
e,+-*  (16') 
when there are contributions  by both national and  foreign lobbies. Comparing  (16) and 
(16'),  we see that influence-seeking  by foreign  lobbies serves to reduce  the  size of  the 
home  tariff  response  to any given  foreign  tariff,  the  more  so the  greater  the  foreign 
industry's  output  and  the  less  price  responsive  the  foreign  country's  export  supply. 
The  foreign  output  Xi  measures  the  size  and  hence  political  clout  of  the  foreign 
industry,  and the slope  of the foreign  export  supply measures  the home  government's 
willingness  to accede  to its wishes  for a smaller tariff,  in view of the induced  effect  on 
the  international  price. 
1 The Johnson  equilibrium  also obtains when  all voters belong  to a lobby group  and 
all industries  are politically  organized.  In this case,  all individuals  are able to express 
their  political  demands  to  the  politicians,  and  so  all are  equally  represented  in  the 
political process. The opposing  interest groups  neutralize one another in their attempts 
to transfer  income  to themselves,  and what remains  is only  the terms-of-trade  motive 
for  trade  policy  that  potentially  benefits  them  all.  Becker  (1983)  derives  a  similar 
neutrality  result  in a somewhat  different  model  of  the  political process. 
12 We omit  the  industry  subscript  for  the  time  being  since all parameters  and  vari- 
ables refer  to industry  i. TRADE  WARS  691 
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FIG.  1.-Trade  war equilibrium 
benevolent dictators that rule each country. The curves are vertical 
and horizontal, respectively, in the constant elasticity case. The in- 
verse elasticity  rule gives the equilibrium  policies in the  Johnson equi- 
librium,  Tj =  1 +  (l/E*)  and  *  =  1 -  (l/E).  These  are, of  course, 
a tariff at home  (T  >  1) and an export  tax abroad  (<  K  1). 
In  the  trade  war between  politically  motivated  governments,  the 
market-clearing  world  price  for  good  i can be  found  using  (9) and 
the expressions  that define  the constant elasticity import demand  and 
export  supply  functions.  We find 
1(T,  T*) =  (  (\)  (\)  (17) 
Also,  (16) and  (16*)  give  the  equilibrium  policy  responses,  which  in 
the constant  elasticity case can be written as 
1  IL 
- 
OtLX(TIT) 
(  e*)  [  a  +  cL  EfM(TIT) '  (18) 
and 
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where  the  -r in  (18)  and  (18*)  represents  the  equilibrium  -rrT,  T*) 
given  in (17). 
Figure  1 shows the equilibrium  responses  for an industry  with ac- 
tive  lobby  groups  in  both  countries  (i.e.,  IL  =  IL*  =  1). The  home 
country's  equilibrium  response  function  (18)  is  represented  by PP 
(P  for  political)  and  the  foreign  country's  (18*)  by P*P*.  The  PP 
curve lies everywhere  to the right of BB and has a U-shape: it asymp- 
totes to BB at T =  1 +  (1/E*) and to a ray from  the origin  as T grows 
large.'3  The  P*P*  curve  lies  everywhere  above  B*B*  and  always 
slopes  upward.'4 
Point  W depicts  the  political  equilibrium  in  the  trade  war.'5 This 
point  lies  to  the  northeast  of  the  Johnson  equilibrium  at  point J. 
Evidently,  the politically motivated  governments  tilt trade policies  in 
favor of their organized  special interests;  the home  tariff is higher  in 
the  political  equilibrium  than  in  the Johnson  equilibrium,  whereas 
the foreign  export  tax is lower or possibly even  a subsidy.'6 
Next  we examine  how the policy outcome  changes  when  the politi- 
cal climate  does.  Suppose  that the  home  politicians  were  to become 
less  sensitive  to  the  public  interest  and  more  concerned  with  their 
campaign  finances;  that is, consider  a decrease  in a. For the  case of 
a  home  import  good  with  active  lobbies  in  each  country,  figure  1 
describes  the  initial equilibrium.  A decline  in a causes  the PP  curve 
to  shift  up,  moving  the  equilibrium  up  and  to  the  right  along  the 
fixed  P*P*  schedule.'7  The  new  equilibrium  entails  a higher  home 
13 From (18) we see that T ->  X  if and only if the term in brackets on the right-hand 
side  approaches  zero.  Since X(T'N)/(T'N)-e  is an increasing  function  of  Tv,  this gives  a 
unique  value  for  TT  and  therefore  T/T* (see  [17])  as T grows large. 
14  The  right-hand  side  of  (18*)  declines  in  the  foreign  price  p*  =  T*IT  because 
foreign  exports  (m*p*'*), which  are  the  difference  between  foreign  output  and  de- 
mand,  are more  sensitive  to p* than  foreign  supply  (X*). But,  from  (17),  we see  that 
the  foreign  price  T*IT  increases  in T*/T.  It follows  that P*P*  must slope  upward.  We 
note that the slope would be ambiguous  if the sector's input owners were unorganized 
(i.e.,  if IL*  =  0). 
15 The  diagram  shows  a unique  equilibrium,  which  exists  when  the  P*P*  curve  is 
steeper  than  the  PP  curve  for  T and  T*  large.  If  the  PP  curve  becomes  steeper  as T 
and  T*  grow large,  then  the curves  have either  zero or two intersections.  In the event 
that there  are two, our remarks apply only to the equilibrium  associated  with the first 
crossing. 
16 The  trade war generates  both higher  import  tariffs and higher  export  taxes than 
the Johnson  equilibrium  for  industries  in  which  the  import-competing  interests  are 
organized  but the  export  interests  are not.  Where  the  export  interests  are organized 
and the import-competing  interests are not, the trade taxes are lower in both countries 
than  at J  and  may  even  turn  to  subsidies  in  one  or  both  countries.  Finally,  import 
tariffs  are lower  and  export  taxes  higher  than  at J in industries  that have  organized 
lobbies  in  neither  country;  then  the  organized  groups  representing  other  industries 
bid unopposed  for lower consumer  prices, at the expense  of the unrepresented  specific 
factor owners. 
17 Given  T,  eq.  (18)  requires  an increase  in  T*  in response  to a decline  in a, so that 
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tariff and a lower foreign  export  tax (or higher  export  subsidy). The 
increase  in  the  tariff  comes  about  in  the  first instance  because  the 
lobby perceives  a smaller  marginal  cost of  "buying" protection  from 
the  government.  Since  the  foreign  lobbies  and  the  foreign  govern- 
ment expect  a more  protectionist  stance from the home  government, 
the  political  calculus  changes  there  as well.  In  particular,  a  higher 
domestic  tariff  means,  ceteris  paribus,  a lower  world  price  for  the 
good.  This  decreases  both  the  private  benefit  and  social  cost  of  an 
export  subsidy, but the latter falls by proportionately  more. Thus  the 
industry's willingness  to pay for a subsidy (or to resist a tax) declines 
by less than  the  cost to the  government  of  providing  the  favor.  The 
new foreign  policy is more  favorable  to the foreign  industry. 
We note  that the rise in the import  tariff and the fall in the export 
tax have  offsetting  implications  for  internal  prices  in  each  country. 
The  increase  in  the  home  tariff  raises  the  home  price  despite  the 
resultant  improvement  in the  terms of  trade,  but the  fall in the  for- 
eign export  tax pushes  the home  price down via its effect  on  Tr.  Simi- 
larly, the increase in T*  puts upward pressure on p*, but the terms-of- 
trade  movement  associated  with  the  rise in T works  in  the  opposite 
direction.  The  figure  shows,  however,  that 7/T* must rise."8 Since Arr 
is an increasing  function  of  T/T*  and Pear is a decreasing  function  of 
this same  ratio,  the  decline  in a causes  the  internal  price  of  a home 
import  good  to rise at home  and  to fall abroad. 
The  change  in the  political  environment  affects  organized  export 
industries  in much  the same way. Figure  2 shows the policy outcome 
for  such  a sector.  Since  our  labeling  convention  makes  the  foreign 
country  the exporter  of  the good  in question,  we represent  a reduc- 
tion in the government's  concern  about aggregate  welfare  by a cut in 
a*. This shifts the P*P*  curve to the left. The  export  tax (or subsidy) 
may rise or fall, whereas  the import  tariff always falls. But no matter 
which  way the  exporting  country's  policy  changes,  T/T*  must  fall,  so 
again  the  internal  price  rises  in  the  country  that  experiences  the 
change  in  its  political  environment  and  falls  in  the  other.  In  both 
the export  and  import  cases,  an increased  government  sensitivity  to 
the  concerns  of  special  interests  in  one  country  raises  the  profits 
of the organized  factor owners in that country at the expense  of their 
counterparts  abroad. 
The  analysis shows  how  the  domestic  political environments  color 
the strategic interactions  between  countries.  We have seen  that a de- 
cline in the home  parameter  a induces  a change  in the foreign  coun- 
try's policy  that  improves  the  home  country's  terms  of  trade.  This 
18  At each  point  along  P*P*,  the  curve  is flatter than  a ray to that point  from  the 
origin.  This  implies  that T*/T falls as we move  out and  to the right along  the  curve. 694  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
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raises the  potential  for  a political  paradox:  a government  that is unre- 
sponsive to the public interest might actually serve the general voter well, 
because  the self-interested  government  can credibly  commit  to a policy of ag- 
gressive  support  for the domestic  industry. 
V.  Trade  Talks 
We have  portrayed  the interactions  between  government  officials  in 
different  countries  who  pursue  their  selfish  interests  while  setting 
their  nations'  trade  policies.  These  officials  are  willing  to  impose 
deadweight  losses on their constituencies  as a means of amassing cam- 
paign  contributions.  Thus  the  economic  inefficiency  of  the  political 
equilibrium  will not be a matter of overriding  concern  to them.  How- 
ever, there  is another  sort of inefficiency  inherent  in the equilibrium 
of  Section  IV that may be of  greater  concern.  By choosing  their  na- 
tional  policies  noncooperatively,  the  incumbent  politicians  impose 
avoidable  political  costs on  one  another.  If  the  politicians  recognize 
this, they may be willing and indeed  anxious  to enter  into a multilat- 
eral trade negotiation.  In this section we study equilibria that emerge 
from  trade talks between  politically motivated  governments. 
We  allow  the  two  governments  to  bargain  over  the  trade  policy 
schedules  r and  *. For the moment,  we also allow them  to negotiate TRADE WARS  695 
a transfer  payment  R (positive  or negative)  that the  foreign  country 
pays to the home country as part of the negotiated  agreement.'9  Some 
trade pacts such as the European  Community's  common  agricultural 
policy  actually call for  such  intercountry  transfers.  However,  as we 
shall see below, the bargaining  game has essentially  the same equilib- 
rium when R is constrained  to zero. Thus  our results apply also when 
transfers  are infeasible. 
It proves convenient  for the exposition  to begin with a case in which 
organized  owners  of  specific  factors  constitute  a negligible  fraction 
of  the  voters  in  each  country. WithaL  =  UP  =  0,  the  members  of 
lobby groups  enjoy a negligible  share of the surplus from consuming 
nonnumeraire  goods,  and they pay a negligible  fraction  of  the head 
taxes levied by the governments.  Thus  the interest groups worry only 
about their factor incomes and the amounts of their political contribu- 
tions. In the negotiation  game,  the organized  lobbies tie their contri- 
butions  to the policies  that emerge  from  the international  talks; that 
is, contributions  are  functions  of  r and  r*. In  general,  the  lobbies 
might  also  condition  their  contributions  on  the  size of  the  interna- 
tional transfer.  But they need  not do so here because  their members 
are so few in number  that they receive or contribute  only a negligible 
fraction of  any payment  that is made. 
Confronted  with  the  set of  contribution  schedules  {C(r,  r*)}, the 
home  government  comes  to  the  bargaining  table  with  the  goal  of 
maximizing 
G =  iEL  C(r,  ar*) +  a[W(r, Ar*)  + R].  (19) 
The  first term in (19) is the total amount  of campaign  contributions. 
The  second  term  represents  per  capita welfare  weighted  by the  pa- 
rameter a reflecting  the government's  concern  for the public interest. 
Notice  that the transfer  R has been  added  to the  previously  defined 
measure  of  average  gross welfare.  This  reflects our  assumption  that 
transfer  payments  are  combined  with  any  net  revenue  from  trade 
taxes and subsidies and that the government  redistributes the surplus 
(or collects  the  shortfall)  on  an  equal  per  capita basis. The  same  is 
true of  the foreign  government,  so its objective becomes 
G*=  XiEL*  C*(T*,  r)  +  a*[W*(T*, r) -  R].  (19*) 
For now, we do not commit  ourselves  to any particular bargaining 
procedure.  Rather  we  assume  only  that  the  politicians  settle  on  an 
outcome  that is efficient  from their own selfish perspectives.  In other 
words, we assume that the trade policies that emerge  from the negoti- 
19  While  we allow  official,  government-to-government  transfers,  we do not allow  side 
payments  (i.e., "kickbacks")  from one set of politicians  to the other. 696  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
ation are such  that G could  not be  raised without  lowering  G*. The 
Nash  bargaining  solution  and  Rubinstein's  (1982)  noncooperative 
bargaining  equilibrium,  among  others,  have this efficiency  property. 
Efficiency requires the governments  to choose  the trade policy vectors 
to maximize  the weighted  sum 
a*G  +  aG* =  a* 1iEL  CQr, ,*)  +  a liEL*  CiT*,T  ) 
(20) 
+  a*a[W(,  A*) +  W*(,r*, r)]. 
Once  this  sum  has  been  maximized,  the  governments  can  use  the 
international  transfer  to select (almost) any utility pair (G, G*) on the 
straight line defined  by (20).2o 
We are now in a position  to define  an equilibrium  in the two-stage 
game in which lobbies set contribution  schedules  noncooperatively  in 
the first stage and the governments  bargain over trade policies in the 
second. 
DEFINITION  3. An  equilibrium  trade  agreement  consists  of  sets of 
political  contribution  functions  {Ci?}ieL  and  {Ci?}iEL*  and  a  pair  of 
trade policy vectors ?r and  *?  such that (a) 
(.,  1.*O)  -  arg max a*  *iEL  C7(1.,  A*) 
+  a  iEL* C!(r*,vr)  +  a*a[W(,r,1A*)  +  W*(r*, r)]; 
(b) for  every  organized  lobby  i  E  L,  there  does  not  exist  a feasible 
contribution  function  CQ(, a*) and a pair of  trade policy vectors  (at', 
1*t)  such that (i) 
(ri, El*i) = arg max a*[Ci(T,  T*)  +  Oj~ijEL C;(o,  a.*)] 
(T.  T*) 
+ a 1jEL*  Cj(Wr*,  1)  +  a*a[W(,1A*) + W*(1.*,  1)] 
and  (ii) 
WV(1T.,  f*i)  -CT(,  f*i)  >  Wi(TV,  T*?)  -Ci(T',  T*  ); 
(c) for  every  organized  lobby  i  E  L*,  there  does  not  exist  a feasible 
contribution  function  C(*(T*, T) and a pair of trade  policy vectors  (aT, 
*i)  such that (i) 
(T'i  1.*i)  -  arg max a* 1jEL  C( (T.  T*) 
(,r,,r*) 
I  I 
+ a[C(I(T*,  T) +  1j~ijEL*  C0O(T*,  T)] 
+  a*a[W(T,  T*)  +  W*(T*, T)] 
20 Equation  (20) is derived  as a weighted  sum of  (19) and  (19*), after R is canceled. 
The  only  restriction  on  feasible  (G, G*)  is that  neither  government  can  promise  to 
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and  (ii) 
WNrT*i  1Ti)  -  C* (T*i,  'i)  >  Wr(*o, To)-C  r*O,  i0) 
Condition  a of  the  definition  stipulates  that the  settlement  is effi- 
cient  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  two  negotiating  governments. 
Note  that efficiency  here  means  maximization  of the joint  welfare  of 
the two sets of politicians,  not Pareto efficiency  for voters.  Condition 
b, analogous  to the similarly labeled condition  of definition  1, requires 
that  it  be  impossible  for  any  organized  lobby  group  in  the  home 
country  to gain by restructuring  its contribution  schedule,  consider- 
ing  that  the  two  governments  will  settle  on  a different  agreement 
when  one  of  them  faces  an  altered  set  of  political  incentives.  The 
same must be true for organized  interest  groups  in the foreign  coun- 
try, which is the meaning  of condition  c. The  equilibrium  trade agree- 
ment  also entails a certain transfer, R',  the size of which will depend 
on the details of  the bargaining  process. 
This  two-country  game  has a structure  almost identical  to the one 
that characterizes  policy setting in a small country  (see Grossman and 
Helpman  1994).  In the case of a small country,  the organized  lobbies 
set contribution  schedules  that induce  their common  agent  (the gov- 
ernment)  to  take  a  policy  action  in  light  of  the  perceived  costs  to 
the  agent.  The  various  schedules  are  set  simultaneously,  and  each 
constitutes  a best response  to the  others.  Here  there  are two sets of 
organized  lobbies, but still they set their schedules  simultaneously  and 
noncooperatively.  While  there  is no  identifiable  common  agent,  the 
objective  function  in  (20)  can be interpreted  as being  that of  an "as 
if" mediator  or a surrogate  world  government.  In other  words,  the 
equilibrium  trade  agreement  is the  same  one  that  would  arise  if  a 
single  decision  maker  had  the  preferences  given  on  the  right-hand 
side of  (20) and  a large  set of  interest  groups  constituting  the  orga- 
nized lobbies of both countries  bid to influence  this agent's decisions. 
Once  again,  the  equilibrium  policies  can be found  by application  of 
lemma 2 in Bernheim  and Whinston  (1986).  That  is, we replace  con- 
ditions  b and  c of  definition  3  by  the  requirement-analogous  to 
(10)-that  the  negotiated  policy  outcome  must  maximize  the joint 
welfare of each organized  lobby and the hypothetical  mediator,  when 
the  contribution  schedules  of  all  other  lobbies  are  taken  as  given. 
This  requirement  can be written  as 
(J,,r*?)  = arg max a*[Wj(, Ar*)  -  Ca(r, A*)] 
(,r,,r*)I 
a* 1iEL  Ci(r,  r*) +  a Y 0EL*C  .  i,  (a  )  (21) 
+  a*a[W(,r,  *) +  W*(,r*, A)]  for allj EL 698  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
and 
(,T'o,*?)  =  argmaxa[W'r(T*,T)  -  C:*?(T* a)] 
(rr*) 
+  a IiEL  C (ar,  a*)  +  a IiEL*  CO(ar*,  r)  (2 1*) 
+  a*a[W(,  r*)  +  W*(r*, r)]  for allj EL*. 
Now we introduce  the assumption,  as we did before,  that all contri- 
bution  schedules  are  differentiable  around  the  equilibrium  point. 
Then  we  can  make  use  of  the  first-order  conditions  that character- 
ize  the  solutions  to  the  maximization  in  condition  a of  definition  3 
and  the  maximizations  in  (21)  and  (21*).  Combining  these,  we  find 
that the equilibrium  contribution  schedules  again are locally truthful 
and that the agreed-on  policies  must satisfy 
a* 1iEL  VTW1('r0  TiT*)  +  a 1iEL*  VTW!r(T*o,  r') 
+  a*a[VT  W(r', ,r*)  +  VT  W*(,r*o,  TO)] =  (22) 
and 
a*  IiEL  VT*W1('', T  *)  + a 1iEL*  VT*W!  (rT*, i'T) 
+  a*a[VT*W(Tr,T*o)  +  VT*W*(Tr*O,  T)]  = o.  (22*) 
It is straightforward  to calculate the partial derivatives  in (22) and 
(22*). Substituting  these  expressions,  we obtain 
a*[IjLXj +  a(T?  -  l)UjM;](QT  +  T>TJ,)  I 
~~~~~~(23) 
+  a[I]*'X* +  a*(T70  -  1)TrjM*']T*?rjj  =  forE  L 
and 
aF[Ij*LX  +  a*(T}*  -  1)7rjM*']Q(nT  +  Tj*12)(2* 
+  a*[IjLXj  +  a(T? -  1) 7jM;]T>1j2 =  0  forjEL*. 
Equations  (23)  and  (23*)  are two sets of  equations  that, if indepen- 
dent,  might be used to solve for ?r and  r*'. However,  these equations 
are  linearly  dependent.2  In  other  words,  the  equilibrium  require- 
ments  that  we  have  stated  so  far  determine  only  the  ratios  T?/Tj*?, 
Tv*?  .  .  .  v Tn/T*0,  but  not  ro and  r*0  separately.  We  shall explain 
the  meaning  of  this finding  presently,  but first we derive  from  (23) 
and (23*) the following  equation  that implicitly gives the equilibrium 
21 To  establish this, use  the  properties  of the  price  functions  ri+(-)  stated in n. 9. TRADE  WARS  699 
policy ratio in industry  i: 
-P  i  (  (24) 
- (  a*  ..A,'i*')  fori=  1,2,...,n. 
Notice  that  when  both  sides  of  (24)  are  divided  by  T<0,  the  trade 
policies enter  this equation  only in ratio form.22 
On reflection,  it is clear why definition  3-which  we have  used  to 
characterize  an equilibrium  trade  pact-pins  down  only  the  ratio of 
the two countries'  trade  policies  and  not  the  levels of  those  policies. 
The definition  stipulates that the equilibrium  must be efficient  for the 
two governments  without  specifying  how the surplus  will be divided 
between  them.  But  the  ratio Ti/vi* determines  the  internal  prices p. 
and Pi, which  in turn  determine  industry  outputs,  demands,  trade 
flows,  and  factor  prices  in  each  country.  In  short,  the  allocation  of 
resources  does  not depend  separately on Ti and  i,  and neither  does 
the joint  welfare  available to the two sets of  politicians.23 
This brings us to an important  point: Equation (24) must characterize 
the equilibrium  trade agreement  even if intercountry  transfer  payments are 
constrained  to be zero. Since  allocations  do  not  depend  separately  on 
the sizes of  the  policy wedges  in the two countries,  the  governments 
can mimic  any international  transfer  payment  by increasing  (or de- 
creasing)  some  Tv  and v  while holding  their ratio constant.  Consider 
what this would  do  to trade  tax revenue  in each  country.  The  reve- 
nues that the home  country derives from the tax or subsidy in indus- 
try  i  total  r,  =  (Ti  -  1) 1TrM,, and  those  that  the  foreign  country 
collects  amount  to  r`* =  (hi* -  1) iTM`.  An  equiproportionate  in- 
crease in Tv  and Tv leaves T1rr  Ti,  T>ri,  Mi, and Mi* unchanged.  There- 
fore,  tax receipts  must  rise in the  country  that imports  good  Xi and 
fall in  the  country  that  exports  this  good.  Moreover,  the  offsetting 
changes  in government  revenue  have exactly the same size. Thus  an 
equiproportionate  increase  in Tv  and Tv is in every way equivalent  to 
a direct transfer  from  the  exporting  country  to the importing  coun- 
22 That  is, X  and Mix are  functions  of pi =  rja,,  which  is homogeneous  of  degree 
zero  in Tj and  ri*. Similarly,  Xi  and M~i' are  functions  of pi*  =  ti~ri, which  is also 
homogeneous  of  degree  zero  in  ri and  'ri.  Finally, the  term  <'rrj appears  directly  in 
the  denominator  of  both  expressions  in parentheses,  once  the  equation  has been  di- 
vided  through  by <i.  Thus  they  all can be expressed  as functions  of the  ratio 'Tj/r,. 
23 Mayer  (1981)  noted  this  point  in  his  discussion  of  efficient  bargaining  between 
two aggregate-welfare-maximizing  governments. 700  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
try. It follows that a bargain that is efficient  when  transfers  are feasi- 
ble remains  so when  they are not.24 
Recall that we have so far restricted  attention  to the case in which 
lobby group  members  constitute  a negligible  fraction of the total vot- 
ing population.  We can now extend  the analysis to the more  general 
case. When  OtL '  0 and ot*  ?0,  the following  formula  applies in place 
of  (24): 
-  IiL  -  OL  Xi.) 
ia  +  OtL  1TMAJ 
a* +  ot*  iM-i 
This  can be derived  in one  of  two ways. First, we can impose  R  =  0 
and solve the common  agency  problem  involving  lobbies with objec- 
tives v' =  W.('r,  T*)  -  CQ(,  r*) and v*i  =  W! (T*, T) -  CQ(r*,  T), and 
a hypothetical  mediator  who  maximizes  the  right-hand  side  of  (20). 
The  derivation  proceeds  as before.  Alternatively,  we can  allow R  # 
0, but  then  we  must  permit  the  lobbies  to condition  their  contribu- 
tions  on  the  sizes of  the  transfers  obtained  by their  governments  as 
part of  the  trade  agreement.  If  we  allow  for  this  dependence  and 
write C  '()  =  Ci('r, T*) +  XiR, and  similarly for  the  foreign  lobbies, 
then  we can once  again  derive  (25)  as the  outcome  of  the  common 
agency  problem.25 
Equation  (25)  reveals  that,  relative  to  free  trade,  the  negotiated 
trade agreement  favors  the  industry  group  that has greater  political 
clout.  We have  Ti/vi* >  1 when  the  first term  in  parentheses  on  the 
right-hand  side  exceeds  the  second  and  -i/T<  K  1 when  the  second 
exceeds  the first. Since  -/T  =  1 in free trade and the home  (foreign) 
domestic  price is an increasing  (decreasing)  function  of T  it is the 
24  In the  event  that lobbies  can  offer  contributions  to  politicians  in either  country, 
all campaign  giving  will be concentrated  on  the single  government  that is more  easily 
swayed by such  gifts.  That  is, each  industry,  no  matter where  it is located,  will offer 
nothing  to the government  that places the greater weight on its average voter's welfare 
and will devote  all its efforts  to influencing  the negotiating  position  of the government 
that more  readily trades off  voter well-being  for campaign  funds.  The  upshot  is that, 
instead  of  (24), the  negotiated  tariff schedule  will satisfy 
0  a 
___o  -  a  fori  =  1,2.n  (24') 
where  a  =  min(a,  a*). 
25 We  can  also  show  that  no  lobby  can  improve  its  lot  by  deviating  to  an  arbi- 
trary contribution  function  Ci(T, A*, R) in place of  the one  with the  form  Ci(r, T*)  + 
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politically stronger  industry  that winds up with greater  profits under 
the agreement  as compared  to free  trade. 
Several components  enter into the measurement  of political power. 
First and foremost,  political power derives from representation  in the 
political process.  If the  specific  factor  owners  in industry  i are orga- 
nized in one  country  and not in the other,  then  the organized  group 
always secures from the trade agreement  a gain relative to free trade. 
When  both  countries'  specific  factor  owners  are organized  in  some 
industry,  then  the  more  powerful  group  is the one  with the  greater 
stake in the negotiation  (i.e., Xi vs. Xi),  the one  with the government 
that places less weight  on average  welfare  (i.e., a vs. a*), and the one 
in the  country  in  which  a smaller  fraction  of  the  voting  population 
bids for policies (i.e., OtL  VS.  aZ). Also, an industry interest group at 
home  gains a political advantage  relative to its foreign  counterpart  if 
the home  import  demand  or export  supply is less price sensitive than 
that abroad.  A high  price  sensitivity  raises the  cost to a government 
of distorting  prices and thus makes the government  less open  to the 
industry's bids for protection. 
When  the interest  groups  in industry  i enjoy equal political power 
in the two countries,  a negotiated  agreement  gives rise to equal rates 
of import  tax and export  subsidy. In the event,  internal  prices, world 
prices,  and  industry  outputs  and  profit  levels  will be the  same  as in 
free trade. This  finding  points to the conclusion  that whatever  aggre- 
gate  efficiency  losses  result  from  the  negotiated  trade  agreement, 
they  stem  not  from  the  mere  existence  of  special-interest  politics  in 
the two countries,  but from  differences  in the extent  of  the  political 
pressures  that the interest  groups  can bring to bear. A trade negotia- 
tion pits the powerful  lobbies in one country  against those in another 
and thereby  neutralizes  (to some  extent)  the  power  of  each one. 
Notably  absent  from  the  formula  in  (25)  is  any  measure  of  the 
relative market power of the two countries.  That  is, the foreign  trade 
elasticities-which  fully  determine  the Johnson  equilibrium  and  ap- 
pear as components  of the trade war equilibrium  discussed  in Section 
IV-are  neglected  by the  hypothetical  mediator  of  the  trade  agree- 
ment.  As  is well  known,  policy-induced  terms-of-trade  movements 
benefit  one  country  at the  expense  of  the  other  and  impose  a dead- 
weight loss on the world economy.  An efficient  negotiation  will elimi- 
nate this source  of  deadweight  loss while  perhaps  compensating  the 
party that otherwise  would  have captured  the benefits. 
It is time now to introduce  a specific bargaining  procedure  in order 
to show how this determines  the division  of surplus  between  the two 
negotiating  parties. For illustrative purposes,  we adopt the Rubinstein 
(1982)  bargaining  model,  as extended  by Binmore,  Rubinstein,  and 
Wolinsky (1986) and Sutton (1986) to incorporate  the risk that negoti- 702  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
ations might break down  at any moment  when  an agreement  has not 
yet been  reached. 
Suppose  that  the  two  governments  meet  at the  bargaining  table 
with the  trade war equilibrium  of  Section  IV as the  status quo  ante. 
The  governments  take turns proposing  vectors of trade policies T and 
T*  to  replace  those  in  the  noncooperative  equilibrium.  When  one 
government  makes  an offer,  the  other  can accept  or reject.  If  it ac- 
cepts,  the  agreement  goes  into  effect  immediately.  If it rejects, then 
a period  of  time  passes  during  which  the  policies  given  in  (16) and 
(16*) remain  in force.  At the end  of  this period  the talks may termi- 
nate exogenously  or else the second  government  will get an opportu- 
nity to make a counterproposal.  Termination  happens  with probabil- 
ity  1 -  CPA, where  A represents  the  length  of  a bargaining  period 
and  3 is a parameter  measuring  the  likelihood  of  a breakdown  per 
unit  of  time.  The  process  of  alternating  proposals  continues  until 
either  an agreement  is reached  or a breakdown  occurs.  In the event 
of the latter, the noncooperative  equilibrium  continues  indefinitely. 
In this setting,  there  are two costs of failing to reach an immediate 
agreement.  First, the noncooperative  equilibrium  applies  during  the 
bargaining  period.  Second,  the parties face the risk that the talks will 
come  to an end.  To  capture  the cost of delay, we introduce  discount 
rates p and p* for the two governments.  They  could  arise, for exam- 
ple, if politicians and factor owners  have the same discount  rates and 
if  the  politicians  did  not  collect  their  promised  gifts  until  after  the 
talks were completed.26 The  discount  rates imply that the home  gov- 
ernment  perceives  the value of an agreement  reached  after k rounds 
of  bargaining  to be  e-PA(k-  1) times  as great as the value of  an agree- 
ment  with identical  provisions  that is signed  immediately. 
In  this bargaining  game,  neither  government  has  an incentive  to 
offer  a set of policies when  another  set would  provide  strictly greater 
welfare  to both  governments.  In other  words,  the  offers  must  max- 
imize  the  right-hand  side  of  (20).  Let  the  maximal  value  for  this 
expression  be G. Then  we can think of the governments  as bargaining 
directly over the instantaneous  welfare  levels G and G* subject to the 
constraint  that a*G  +  aG*  =  G. Once  a distribution  of  welfare  has 
been  agreed  on,  the  governments  can implement  the  agreement  by 
choosing  policies  that satisfy (25) and that divide  the trade  tax reve- 
nues  as required  by the agreement. 
We  can  solve  the  bargaining  game  in  the  manner  suggested  by 
Sutton (1986).  Let the home  country  make the first offer,  and denote 
26 The  governments'  discount  factors also reflect the  fact that the incumbent  politi- 
cians may not remain  in power  forever.  We view the discount  factors as a simple  way 
to  capture  whatever  costs  the  governments  perceive  to  be  associated  with  delay  in 
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its proposed  division  of  the surplus  by (GH, G*).  Of course  the  pro- 
posal must satisfy 
a*GH  +  aG  G.  (26) 
Moreover,  the offer  will be such as to induce  immediate  acceptance 
while leaving the foreign  government  with no extra surplus relative to 
what it could achieve by refusing  the offer.  If the foreign  government 
accepts, it receives  G* forever.  If it rejects, the noncooperative  equi- 
librium continues  on for a period of at least A. Then,  with probability 
1  -  esOA&,  the  negotiations  end  and  the  noncooperative  equilibrium 
persists forever;  with  probability  eqOA&,  the  foreign  government  gets 
the  opportunity  to  make  a counteroffer,  which  we  denote  by  (GFE 
G*).  The  foreign  government  would  always  choose  an  offer  that 
would  (just) be accepted,  so it can count  on a flow of utility G* after 
the delay of  A, if the  talks do  not break down.  The  home  offer  that 
makes the foreign  government just indifferent  between accepting and 
rejecting satisfies 
G*  -F'P* 
p*  -e  G*  L 
[(  e  )eP  G*  +  e  P*AG*] 
where G* is the flow of utility to the foreign  government  in the nonco- 
operative equilibrium of Section IV. The  two terms on the right-hand 
side represent,  respectively,  the present  value of the utility flow dur- 
ing the  period  before  the first possible counteroffer  (from  time 0 to 
time  A) and  the  expected  value  of  the  flow from  that time  onward. 
Rearranging  this equation  gives 
G  [1 -  e  (?P*)A]G* +  [e  (?P*)A] G**  (27) 
We now derive  the offer  that the foreign  government  would  make 
were  it  to  reach  the  stage  of  counterproposing.  The  counteroffer 
(GF, G *) satisfies 
a*GF + aGF*  =  G,  (26*) 
and it provides  the home  politicians with just  enough  utility to make 
them  indifferent  between  accepting  the  offer  and  waiting  for  the 
chance of still another  bargaining  round.  This indifference  condition 
implies 
GF  =  [1  -  e  (P+P)A]GN  +  [e  (P+P)A]GH,  (28) 
where  GN is the  flow of  utility  to  the  home  government  in  a trade 
war. 
We solve the four equations  (26), (26*), (27), and (28) for the offer 
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always accepted,  we  can  readily  calculate  the  division  of  surplus  in 
the modified  Rubinstein game. As is usual in such games, the outcome 
of the bargaining  depends  on which government  can make the initial 
offer.  However,  the advantage  from going first disappears  as the time 
between  offers  shrinks  to  zero.  With  continuous  bargaining  (i.e., 
A -*  0), the equilibrium  trade pact yields the following  flows of utility 
to the two governments: 
G=2 +  + y  [1  ?Y*  +  (1 + y)GN-  (1  +  y*)G<  (29) 
and 
y+  [  a  G + (1 + y*)GN--(1  + y)GNI,  (29*) 
2 +-  +  y  a+**  aN 
where my  =  p1/ and Ly*  =  p*/1.  Here,  the division of surplus depends 
on the fallback positions.  That  is, each government  captures  more  of 
the gains from cooperation  the greater its measure of political welfare 
in the  trade  war equilibrium.  As  usual,  higher  welfare  in the  status 
quo ante gives a negotiator  a stronger  position at the bargaining  table. 
Each government  also gains more from the trade agreement  the more 
patient it can be while bargaining.  Patience gives a negotiator  a credi- 
ble threat to decline  a low offer,  and  thus her  rival must offer  more 
to ensure  an agreement  without  delay. 
VI.  Conclusions 
In  this  paper  we  have  introduced  special-interest  politics  into  the 
analysis  of  international  trade  relations.  Our  model  features  cam- 
paign contributions  by industry lobbies that induce  policy preferences 
in self-interested  politicians.  We have used  the model  to study policy 
formation  in cooperative  and noncooperative  international  settings. 
Our  approach  rests  on  the  key  assumption  that  interest  groups 
contribute  to politicians with the intention  of influencing  their policy 
choices.  This  assumption  finds support  in the evidence  presented  by 
Magelby and Nelson  (1990)  and Snyder (1990).  Moreover,  economet- 
ric studies  of  congressional  voting  behavior  suggest  that such invest- 
ments  bear  fruit.  For  example,  Baldwin  (1985)  found  that  a  con- 
gressperson  was more  likely  to vote  against  the  Trade  Act  of  1974 
the  greater  the  contributions  he  or  she  received  from  major  labor 
unions  opposed  to the bill; Tosini  and Tower  (1987)  found  a positive 
association between  a vote in favor of the protectionist  Textile  Bill of 
1985 and the size of  donations  received  from  companies  and unions 
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When  governments  set their  trade  policies  noncooperatively,  each 
party neglects  the  impact  of  its policies  on  factor  owners  and  politi- 
cians abroad.  Our  model  predicts  that in such circumstances  higher 
tariff rates will emerge  in industries  that are politically organized,  all 
else  equal.  Rates of  protection  should  vary positively  with  the  stake 
of  the  specific  factor  in  trade  policy  relative  to  that  of  the  average 
voter (i.e., with the ratio of output  to imports)  and inversely  with the 
sizes  of  the  elasticities  of  foreign  export  supply  and  home  import 
demand. 
It is difficult  to evaluate  how  well these  predictions  are borne  out 
by the empirical  evidence.  While there  have been  many econometric 
studies of the determinants  of  protection  across industries,  most suf- 
fer from a number of serious shortcomings.  First, it has been common 
practice  to  include  a long  list of  regressors  when  "explaining"  the 
level of  protection  in an industry.  Often  each regressor  bears only  a 
loose relationship  to some theoretical  concept,  and different  interpre- 
tations can be ascribed to the same right-hand-side  variable. Second, 
many  of  the  (collinear)  regressors  are  intended  to  proxy  the  same 
thing,  so  it is difficult  to  give  meaning  to  the  coefficient  on  one  of 
them  when  others  are implicitly  being  held  constant.  Third,  almost 
all  the  regressions  have  been  estimated  by  ordinary  least  squares, 
despite  the fact that levels of protection  clearly influence  many of the 
supposedly  exogenous  right-hand-side  variables.27 Finally,  none  of 
the  studies  includes  any  regressors  relating  to  foreign  political  and 
economic  conditions,  and  thus  they  implicitly  assume  that  interna- 
tional interdependence  is unimportant  or that foreign  industry condi- 
tions are uncorrelated  with those  at home. 
With  these  caveats  in  mind,  the  evidence  does  suggest  a positive 
association  between  levels  of  protection  and  the  extent  to which  an 
industry  is  politically  organized.  Lavergne  (1983),  Baldwin  (1985), 
and  Trefler  (1993)  have  proxied  political  activism by the  economic 
and geographic  concentration  of firms, since they presumably  affect 
the ease of  organizing  politically.  These  authors  find one  or both  of 
these variables to be a positive  and significant  influence  on the levels 
of tariffs or nontariff  barriers. As for our  prediction  that tariffs  will 
be  higher  in industries  with  more  to  gain  from  protection,  the  evi- 
dence  here  is ambiguous.  Riedel  (1977),  Baldwin  (1985),  and others 
find that protection  is higher  in industries  with greater  levels of  em- 
ployment.  While  consistent  with  our  prediction  (more  employment 
means a larger stake, all else equal), this result is difficult to interpret 
27 An exception  to this rule is the paper by Trefler  (1993),  who estimates an equation 
explaining  the  level  of  nontariff  barriers jointly  with  one  explaining  the  pattern  of 
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because these same authors include  the share of labor in value added 
and  the  import-penetration  ratio  as separate  explanatory  variables. 
Several  studies  find  that import-penetration  ratios are  positively  re- 
lated to the level of protection.  Our model  predicts that the opposite 
should  be  true,  but  again  it is difficult  to  know  what  the  empirical 
results  mean,  both  because  import  penetration  should  really  be 
treated as endogenous  and because the regressions  hold constant sev- 
eral variables related  to the  size of  the domestic  industry.  Finally, as 
for the effects  of the elasticities of import demand  and export  supply, 
they have not been  examined  in any of  the existing  empirical  work. 
Our model also yields predictions  about the outcome  of trade nego- 
tiations.  For example,  when  governments  bargain efficiently,  the  re- 
sulting trade policies for a given industry  should  not reflect the coun- 
tries'  market  power  in  trade.  In  other  words,  the  foreign  export 
supply elasticities that should  enter  into each country's tariff rates in 
a noncooperative  equilibrium  should  have no bearing  on these  rates 
in  a cooperative  settlement.  With  international  bargaining,  rates of 
protection  should  reflect not only the political strength  of the special- 
interest  group  at  home-as  indicated  by  the  extent  of  its  political 
activism, by the ratio of domestic  output  to net trade, and by the size 
of the home  import  demand  or export  supply-but  also the political 
strength of the interest group in the same industry abroad. Protection 
should  be  especially  high  where  the  home  interest  group  is strong 
and the foreign  group  in the  same industry  is weak. When  both  are 
equally strong,  their political influences  will cancel, and international 
prices under  a trade agreement  should  be equal to those  that would 
prevail under  totally free  trade. 
There  is  some  scant  evidence  that  such  international  bargaining 
considerations  do  affect  U.S.  trade  policies.  For example,  Lavergne 
(1983)  finds  that  U.S.  tariff  cuts  have  been  largest  in  industries  in 
which  Canadian  producers  enjoy  the  biggest  U.S.  market  share.  He 
interprets  this  as reflecting  the  outgrowth  of  pressures  brought  by 
the Canadian  government  on behalf  of  its industry  interests  and the 
willingness  of  the  U.S.  government  to concede  in the light  of  corre- 
sponding  concessions  offered  U.S.  exporters.  Still, much  remains  to 
be done  in testing  whether  and  how the  policies  prescribed  by trade 
treaties  reflect  the  political  pressures  that  the  governments  faced 
when  they negotiated  the  pacts. 
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